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Abstract—Differential privacy is a rigorous, worst-case notion
of privacy-preserving computation. Informally, a probabilistic
program is differentially private if the participation of a single
individual in the input database has a limited effect on the
program’s distribution on outputs. More technically, differential
privacy is a quantitative 2-safety property that bounds the
distance between the output distributions of a probabilistic
program on adjacent inputs. Like many 2-safety properties, dif-
ferential privacy lies outside the scope of traditional verification
techniques. Existing approaches to enforce privacy are based on
intricate, non-conventional type systems, or customized relational
logics. These approaches are difficult to implement and often
cumbersome to use.
We present an alternative approach that verifies differen-
tial privacy by standard, non-relational reasoning on non-
probabilistic programs. Our approach transforms a probabilistic
program into a non-probabilistic program which simulates two
executions of the original program. We prove that if the target
program is correct with respect to a Hoare specification, then
the original probabilistic program is differentially private. We
provide a variety of examples from the differential privacy
literature to demonstrate the utility of our approach. Finally,
we compare our approach with existing verification techniques
for privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Program verification provides a rich array of techniques
and tools for analyzing program properties. However, they
typically reason about single program executions or trace
properties. In contrast, many security properties—such as non-
interference in information flow systems—require reasoning
about multiple program executions. These hyperproperties [17]
encompass many standard security analyses, and lie outside the
scope of standard verification tools—to date, there is no gen-
erally applicable method or tool for verifying hyperproperties.
Instead, ad hoc enforcement methods based on type systems,
customized program logics, and finite state automata analyses
have been applied to specific hyperproperties. While these
approaches are effective, their design and implementation
often require significant effort.
A promising alternative is to reduce verification of a hy-
perproperty of a program c to verification of a standard
property of a transformed program T (c). For instance, self-
composition [7], [18] is a general method for reducing 2-safety
properties of a program c—which reason about two runs of c—
to safety properties of the sequential composition c; c′, where
c′ is a renaming of c. Self-composition is sound, complete,
and applies to many programming languages and verification
settings. For instance, it has been used to verify information
flow properties using standard deductive methods like Hoare
logic.
A close relative of self-composition is the synchronized
product construction [38]. This transformation also produces
a program which emulates two executions of the original
program, but while self-composition performs the executions
in sequence, synchronized products perform the executions
in lockstep, dramatically simplifying the verification task for
certain properties. This transformation is an instance of the
more general class of product transformations, as studied by
Zaks and Pnueli [38], and recently by Barthe et al. [4], [5].
While there has been much research on combining prod-
uct constructions and deductive verification to reason about
2-safety for deterministic programs, this approach remains
largely unexplored for probabilistic programs. This is not
for lack of interesting use cases—many security notions of
probabilistic computation are naturally 2-safety properties.
Verifying differential privacy: In this paper, we con-
sider on one such property: differential privacy, which pro-
vides strong guarantees for privacy-preserving probabilistic
computation. Formally, a probabilistic program c is (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private with respect to ǫ > 0, δ ≥ 0, and a
relation1 Φ on the initial memories of c if for every two initial
memories m1 and m2 related by Φ, and every subset A of
output memories,
Pr [c,m1 : A] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr [c,m2 : A] + δ.
Here Pr [c,m : A] denotes the probability of the output mem-
ory landing in A according to distribution JcK m, where JcK
maps an initial memory m to a distribution JcK m of output
memories. Since this definition concerns two runs of the same
probabilistic program, differential privacy is a probabilistic 2-
safety property.
Differentially private algorithms are typically built from two
constructions: private mechanisms, which add probabilistic
noise to their input, and composition, which combines dif-
ferentially private operations into a single one. This composi-
tional behavior makes differential privacy an attractive target
for program verification efforts.
Existing methods for proving differential privacy have been
based on type systems, automata analyses, and customized
program logics. For instance, Fuzz [33], DFuzz [25] and
related systems [24] enforce differential privacy using linear
type systems. This approach is expressive enough to type many
examples, but it is currently limited to pure differential privacy
1We are here taking a generalization of Differential Privacy with respect
to an arbitrary relation Φ. The usual definition is obtained by considering an
adjacency relation between databases.
(where δ = 0), and cannot handle more advanced examples.
Alternatively, Tschantz et al. [37] consider a verification
technique based on I/O automata; again, this approach is
limited to pure differential privacy. Finally, CertiPriv [11] and
EasyCrypt [6] use an approximate relational Hoare logic for
probabilistic programs to verify differential privacy. This ap-
proach is very expressive and can accommodate approximate
differential privacy (when δ 6= 0), but relies on a custom and
complex logic. For instance, ad hoc rules for loops are required
for many advanced examples. Finally, a common weakness of
all of the above approaches is that their implementation is
non-trivial.
Self-products for differential privacy: To avoid these
drawbacks, we investigate a new approach where proving
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy of a program c is reduced to proving
a safety property of a transformed program T (c). In view of
previous work verifying 2-safety properties, a natural choice
for T is some notion of product program. However, the trans-
formed programs would then be probabilistic, and there are
few tools for deductive verification of probabilistic programs.
Targeting a non-probabilistic language is more appealing in
this regard, as there are many established tools for deductive
verification of non-probabilistic programs. Since the original
program is a probabilistic program, a key part of our approach
is to remove the probabilistic behavior from the target.
To define the transformation, we proceed in two steps.
Starting from a probabilistic program c, we first construct the
synchronized product of c with itself. Using the synchronized
product instead of self-composition is essential for our second
step, in which the probabilistic product program is transformed
into a non-probabilistic program.
For this step, we rely on specific features of the differential
privacy property. First, we observe that differential privacy
bounds the ratio—hereafter called the privacy cost—between
the probabilities of producing the same output on two exe-
cutions on nearby databases. Second, we recall that there are
two main tools for building differentially private computations:
private mechanisms, and composition. Private mechanisms and
composition interact with the privacy cost in different ways;
we consider each in turn.
A private mechanism run over two different inputs returns
two closely related distributions, at the cost of consuming
some privacy budget. The privacy cost depends on the distance
between the inputs: as the two inputs become farther apart,
the privacy cost also grows. One fundamental insight (due to
Barthe et al. [10]) we use is that the property of being “closely
related” can be understood as being at distance 0 for a suitable
notion of distance on distributions.
Composition takes a set of differentially private operations
and returns the sequential composition of the operations, which
is also differentially private. By a property of differential
privacy, the privacy cost of the composition is upper bounded
by the sum of the privacy costs of the individual operations.
We build this reasoning directly into our verification system.
First, we apply the synchronized product construction. Then,
we replace two corresponding calls to a mechanism with a call
to an abstract procedure that returns equal outputs, at the cost
of consuming some privacy budget—roughly, being at distance
0 in the probabilistic setting is equivalent to being equal in the
non-probabilistic setting. To keep track of the privacy cost, we
use ghost variables vǫ and vδ which are incremented after each
mechanism is executed, in terms of the distance between their
two inputs.
Note that the second step leverages the synchronized prod-
uct construction: since the two executions are simulated in
lockstep, corresponding calls to a mechanism are next to each
other in the product program. Since mechanisms are the only
probabilistic parts of our source program, our output program
is now non-probabilistic.
To illustrate our approach, consider the following simple
program c:
s; x← Lapǫ(e); return x
where s is a deterministic computation and Lap is the Laplace
mechanism—a probabilistic operator that achieves differential
privacy by adding noise to its input. The synchronized product
T (c) of the program c is
T (s); x1 ← Lapǫ(e1); x2 ← Lapǫ(e2); return (x1, x2)
where T (s) is the synchronized product of s. Then, we make
the program non-probabilistic by replacing the two calls to the
Laplace mechanism with a call to an abstract procedure Lap⋄,
giving the following transformed program T (c).
T (s); (x1, x2)← Lap⋄(e1, e2); return (x1, x2)
Roughly, the specification of the procedure invocation Lap⋄
states that the same value is assigned to x1 and x2. Also, as
side effect, the variable vǫ is updated to increment the privacy
cost, which depends on the distance between the inputs (e1, e2)
to the Laplace mechanism.
Our main result (Theorem 5 in §III) states that once we
perform this transformation, we can use plain Hoare logic to
complete the verification. More concretely, for the example
above, we represent the relation on memories Φ as a predicate
Φˆ on pairs of memories, and prove that c is (ǫ, 0)-differentially
private if the following Hoare specification is valid.
⊢ T (c) : Φˆ ∧ vǫ = 0 =⇒ x1 = x2 ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ0
In the remainder of this article we use the same representation
for a relation and its representation as a predicate on memories.
Contributions: The main contribution of the paper (§III)
is a program transformation that operates on programs built
from sequential, non-probabilistic constructs and differentially
private, probabilistic primitives—such as the Laplace and
Exponential mechanisms. The transformed program is non-
probabilistic, and differential privacy of the original program
can be reduced to a safety property of the transformed pro-
gram. Then we show in §IV that our approach subsumes the
core apRHL logic of Barthe et al. [11], in the sense that every
algorithm provable with core apRHL is also provable with our
approach.
We illustrate the expressiveness of our approach in §V
by verifying differential privacy of several probabilistic algo-
rithms, including a recent algorithm that produces synthetic
datasets using a combination of the multiplicative weights
update rule and the exponential mechanism [29], [28], and
the Propose-Test-Release (PTR) framework [21], [36], which
achieves approximate differential privacy without relying on
output perturbation. Finally, we discuss the example of vertex
cover, which is provable apRHL, but cannot be handled
directly by our approach.
II. A PRIMER ON DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Let us begin by recalling the basic definitions of differential
privacy.
Definition 1: Let ǫ, δ ≥ 0, and let Φ ⊆ S × S be a
relation on S. A randomized algorithm K taking inputs in
S and returning outputs in R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
with respect to Φ if for every two inputs s1, s2 ∈ S such that
s1 Φ s2 and every subset of outputs A ⊆ R,
Pr [K(s1) : A] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr [K(s2) : A] + δ.
When δ = 0, we will call this ǫ-differential privacy.
Our definition is a variant of the original definition of
differential privacy, [22] where input memories are considered
to be databases and Φ relates databases that differ in a
single individual’s data; let us briefly explain the intuition
of differential privacy in this setting. Recall that differential
privacy aims to conceal the participation of individuals in
a study. To distinguish between the participation or non-
participation of an individual, we think of two databases D
and D′ are adjacent or neighboring if they differ only in the
presence or absence of a single record; note that the adjacency
relation is necessarily symmetric.
Differential privacy then states that the two distributions
output by K on a pair of adjacent databases are close. In the
simple case where δ = 0, the definition above requires that the
probability of any output changes by at most a exp(ǫ) factor
when moving from one input to an adjacent input. When δ > 0
these bounds are still valid except with probability δ. In other
words, ǫ controls the strength of the privacy bound, and δ is
the probability of failure in ensuring the privacy bound.
Building private programs: Let F be a deterministic
computation with inputs in T and outputs in R. Suppose that
we want to make the computation of F (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private with respect to some relation Φ. A natural way to
achieve this goal is to add random noise to the evaluation
of F on an input. In general, the noise that we need to add
depends not only on the ǫ and δ parameters (which control the
strength of the privacy guarantee), but also on the sensitivity
of F , a quantity that is closely related to Lipschitz continuity
for functions.
Definition 2: Assume that F is real-valued, i.e. R = R,
and let k > 0. We say that F is k-sensitive with respect to Φ
if |F (t1)− F (t2)| ≤ k for all t1, t2 ∈ T such that t1 Φ t2.
A typical mechanism for privately releasing a k-sensitive
function is the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 1 ([19]): Suppose ǫ > 0. The Laplace mechanism
is defined by
Lapǫ(t) = t+ v,
where v is drawn from the Laplace distribution L(1/ǫ), i.e.
with probability density function
P (v) = exp(−ǫ|v|).
If F is k-sensitive with respect to Φ, then the probabilistic
function that maps t to Lapǫ(F (t)) is (kǫ, 0)-differentially
private with respect to Φ.
Additionally, the Laplace mechanism satisfies a simple
accuracy bound.
Lemma 1: Let ǫ, δ > 0 and let T = log(2/δ)/(2ǫ). Then
for every x, Lapǫ(x) ∈ (x−T, x+T ) with probability at least
1− δ.
Another mechanism that is fundamental for differential
privacy is the Exponential mechanism [31]. Let T be the set of
inputs, typically thought of as the private information. Let R
be a set of outputs, and consider a function F : T ×R → R,
typically called the score function. We first extend the defini-
tion of sensitivity to this function.
Definition 3: Assume F : T × R → R and let c > 0. We
say that F is k-sensitive on T with respect to Φ if |F (t1, r)−
F (t2, r)| ≤ k for all t1, t2 ∈ T such that t1 Φ t2 and r ∈ R.
Then, the Exponential mechanism can be used to output
an element of R that approximately maximizes the score
function, if the score function is k-sensitive.
Theorem 2 ([31]): Let ǫ, c > 0. Suppose that F is k-
sensitive in T with respect to Φ. The Exponential mechanism2
Expǫ(F, t) takes as input t ∈ T , and returns r ∈ R with
probability equal to
exp(ǫF (t, r)/2)∑
r′∈R exp(ǫF (t, r′)/2)
.
This mechanism is (kǫ, 0)-differentially private with respect
to Φ.
A powerful feature of differential privacy is that by com-
posing differentially private mechanisms, we can construct
new mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy. However, the
privacy guarantee will degrade: more operations on a database
will lead to more privacy loss. In light of this composition
property, we will often think of the privacy parameters ǫ and
δ of a program as privacy budgets that are consumed by sub-
operations. This is formalized by the following composition
theorem.
Theorem 3 ([30]): Let q1 be a (ǫ1, δ1)-differentially private
query and let q2 be a (ǫ2, δ2)-differentially private query. Then,
their composition q(t) = (q1(t), q2(t)) is (ǫ1 + ǫ2, δ1 + δ2)-
differentially private.
Finally, differential privacy is closed under post-
processing—an output of a private algorithm can be
2The Exponential mechanism as first introduced by McSherry and Tal-
war [31] is parameterized by a prior distribution µ on R. We consider the
special case where µ is uniform; this suffices for typical applications.
arbitrarily transformed, so long as this processing does not
involve the private database.
Theorem 4: Let q be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mapping
databases to some output range R, and let f : R → R′ be
an arbitrary function. Then, the post-processing f ◦ q is also
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
III. SELF-PRODUCTS
In this section, we formalize the verification of differential-
privacy using traditional Hoare logic. We start with some
preliminary definitions and the pWHILE programming lan-
guage, which will serve as our source language. Then, given a
probabilistic pWHILE program c, we show how to build a non-
probabilistic program T (c) that simulates two executions of c
on different inputs and tracks the privacy cost via two ghost
variables vǫ and vδ. We show that the verification of T (c)
with respect to a particular Hoare logic specification ensures
differential privacy of the original program c.
A. Distributions
We define the set D(A) of sub-distributions over a set A as
the set of functions µ : A→ [0, 1] with discrete support(µ) =
{x | µx 6= 0}, such that ∑x∈A µx ≤ 1; when equality holds,
µ is a true distribution. (We will often refer to sub-distributions
as distributions when there is no confusion.) Sub-distributions
can be given the structure of a complete partial order: for all
µ1, µ2 ∈ D(A),
µ1 ⊑ µ2 def= ∀a ∈ A. µ1 a ≤ µ2 a.
Moreover, sub-distributions can be given the structure of
a monad: for any function g : A → D(B) and distribution
µ : D(A), we define g⋆ µ : D(B) to be the sub-distribution
g⋆ µ (b) def=
∑
a∈A
(g a b)(µa),
for every b ∈ B. Given an element a ∈ A, let 1a be the
probability distribution that assigns all mass to the value a.
We will use a normalization construction (·)# that takes as
input a function f : B → R≥0 over a discrete set B and
returns (f)# ∈ D(B) such that the probability mass of f# at
b is given by
(f)# b def=
f b∑
b′∈B f b′
.
Intuitively, sampling from the distribution (f)# is equivalent
to sampling “with probability proportional to” f .
B. pWHILE Language
pWHILE programs will serve as our source language, and
are defined by the following grammar:
C ::= skip
| C; C sequencing
| V ← E deterministic assignment
| V $← Lapǫ(E) Laplace assignment
| V $← Expǫ(E , E) Exponential assignment
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
| return E return expression
Here, V is a set of variables and E is a set of expressions. We
consider expressions including simply typed lambda terms and
basic operations on booleans, lists and integers. (pWHILE is
equipped with a standard type system; we omit the typing
rules.)
The probabilistic assignments involving Lapǫ(E) and
Expǫ(E , E) internalize the (discrete version of the) mechanisms
of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 respectively. Note that for exam-
ples based on the exponential mechanism we allow function
types for representing the score functions; alternatively these
score functions can be modeled as finite maps if their domain
is finite (as will be the case in our examples).
The semantics of a well-typed pWHILE program is defined
by its (probabilistic) action on memories; we denote the set
of memories by M. A program memory m ∈ M is a partial
assignment of values to variables. Formally, the semantics of
a return-free pWHILE program c is a function JcK : M →
D(M) mapping a memory m ∈M to a distribution JcKm ∈
D(M), as defined in Fig. 1.
For simplicity, we only consider programs of the form
c; return e in the rest of this paper. Then, the semantics of
a program c; return e is simply defined as
Jc; return eK m def= λu.1
⋆
JeKu (JcKm).
C. Target Language
To define the target language of our transformation, we re-
move probabilistic assignments and add an assert instruction,
giving the following grammar:
C ::= skip
| C; C sequencing
| V ← E deterministic assignment
| assert (ϕ) assert
| (V ,V)← Lap⋄ǫ (E , E) Laplace invocation
| (V ,V)← Exp⋄ǫ (E , E , E , E) Exponential invocation
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
| return E return expression
The semantics of this non-deterministic target language is
defined in Figure 2 as a function from a memory to a set of
memories. The assert (ϕ) statement checks at runtime whether
the predicate ϕ is valid, and stops the execution if not. In
order to distinguish the failure of assert statements from non-
terminating while loops, we lift the domain P(M) with a ⊥
element: where
⋃
m∈⊥ f m is defined as ⊥ for any f . We defer
the presentation of the abstract procedures Lap⋄ and Exp⋄ until
the definition of the self-product construction in §III-E.
The enforcement of safety properties over this target lan-
guage is formalized by a standard Hoare logic, with judgments
of the form
⊢ c : Ψ =⇒ Φ.
Here the pre- and post-conditions Ψ and Φ are standard
unary predicates over memories. Hoare logic judgments can
be derived using the rules in Fig. 3; by the standard soundness
of Hoare logic, the derivability of a judgment ⊢ c : Ψ =⇒ Φ
JskipK m = 1m
Jc1; c2K m = Jc2K
⋆ (Jc1Km)
Jx← eK m = 1m{JeKE m/x}
Jx $← Lapǫ(e)K m =
(
λv. 1m{v/x}
)⋆ (
λr.exp
(
− ǫ|r−JeKm|2
))#
Jx $← Expǫ(s, e)K m =
(
λv. 1m{v/x}
)⋆ (
λr.exp
(
ǫJsKm(JeKm,r)
2
))#
Jif e then c1 else c2K m = if (JeKE m = true) then (Jc1Km) else (Jc2Km)
Jwhile e do cK m =
⊔
wim
where w0m = ⊥
wi+1m = if (JeKE m = true) then w⋆i (JcKm) else unitm
Fig. 1: pWHILE semantics
JskipK m = {m}
Jc1; c2K m =
⋃
m′∈Jc1KmJc2Km
Jx← eK m = 1m{JeKE m/x}
Jassert (ϕ)Km = if (JϕKE m) then {m} else ⊥
J(x1, x2)← Lap⋄ǫ (e1, e2)Km =
⋃
vm {v/x1} {v/x2} {vǫ + |e1 − e2|ǫ/vǫ}
J(x1, x2)← Exp⋄ǫ (s1, e1, s2, e2)Km = if (Js1 = s2KE m = true) then⋃
vm {v/x1} {v/x2} {vǫ + |e1 − e2|ǫ/vǫ}
else ⊥
Jif e then c1 else c2K m = if (JeKE m = true) then (Jc1Km) else (Jc2Km)
Jwhile e do cK m =
⊔
wˆim
where wˆ0m = ∅
wˆi+1m = if (JeKE m = true) then
⋃
m′∈(JcKm) wˆim
′
else {m}
Fig. 2: Semantics of the target language
entails the correctness of c with respect to its specification
Ψ,Φ.
D. Product Construction
Before we define the product transformation from pWHILE
to our target language, let us first review some preliminaries
about product programs.
Product programs have been successfully used to verify 2-
safety properties like information-flow, program equivalence,
and program robustness. As mentioned in in the introduction,
a synchronized product program can be used to simulate two
runs of the same program, interleaving the two executions
and often simplifying the verification effort. This technique,
however, has been mostly used in the verification of non-
probabilistic programs. In the rest of this section we provide
a brief introduction to relational verification by product con-
struction and then extend the approach to handle quantitative
reasoning over probabilistic programs.
A simple but necessary concept for the product construction
is memory separability: we say that two programs are sepa-
rable if they manipulate disjoint sets of program variables. In
order to achieve separability in the construction of the product
of a program with itself, program variables are duplicated and
marked with a left (−1) or right (−2) tag. For any program
expression e or predicate ϕ, we let ei and ϕi stand for the
result of renaming every program variable with the tag −i.
Similarly, we say that two memories are disjoint when their
domains (the sets of variables on which they are defined) are
disjoint. Given two disjoint memories m1 and m2, we can
build a memory m = m1 ⊕ m2 representing their (disjoint)
union. In the following, we exploit separability and use
predicates to represent binary relations over disjoint memories
m1 and m2. We will suggestively write m1Φm2 to denote
the unary predicate Φ(m1 ⊕m2) over the combined memory
m1 ⊕m2.
Given two deterministic programs c1 and c2, a general
product program c1×c2 is a syntactic construction that merges
the executions of c1 and c2; this construction is required to
correctly represent every pair of executions of c1 and c2.
⊢ skip : Ψ =⇒ Ψ ⊢ x← e : Φ {e/x} =⇒ Φ ⊢ assert (ϕ) : Φ ∧ ϕ =⇒ Φ
⊢ c1 : Ψ =⇒ ϕ ⊢ c2 : ϕ =⇒ Φ
⊢ c1; c2 : Ψ =⇒ Φ
⊢ c1 : Ψ ∧ b =⇒ Φ ⊢ c2 : Ψ ∧ ¬b =⇒ Φ
⊢ if b then c1 else c2 : Ψ =⇒ Φ
Ψ ∧ v ≤ 0⇒ ¬b ⊢ c : Ψ ∧ b ∧ v = k =⇒ Ψ ∧ v < k
⊢ while b do c : Ψ =⇒ Ψ ∧ ¬b
⊢ c : Ψ′ =⇒ Φ′ Ψ⇒ Ψ′ Φ′ ⇒ Φ
⊢ c : Ψ =⇒ Φ
Fig. 3: Hoare logic for non-probabilistic programs
Traditional program verification techniques can then be used
to enforce a relational property over c1 and c2.
In self-composition [7], [18], the product construction c1×
c2 is defined simply by the sequential composition c1; c2.
An inconvenience of self-composition is that the verification
of c1; c2 usually requires independent functional reasoning
over c1 and c2. The synchronized product construction solves
this problem by interleaving execution of two runs of the
same program—by placing corresponding pieces of the two
executions of a program close together, synchronized product
programs can more easily maintain inductive invariants relat-
ing the two runs. Not only does synchronization reduce the
verification effort, we will soon see that synchronization is
the key feature that enables our verification approach.
E. Building the Product
We embed the quantitative reasoning on probabilistic pro-
grams by introducing the special program variables vǫ and
vδ, which serve to accumulate the privacy cost. For every
statement c, the self-product ⌈c⌉ is formally defined by the
rules shown in Fig. 5. In a nutshell, the deterministic fragment
of the code is duplicated with appropriate variable renaming
with the flags −1 and −2, and the control flow is fully
synchronized, i.e., the two executions of the same program
must take all the same branches—we use the assert statements
to enforce this property.
Moreover, for the self-product of a program c to correctly
represent two executions of itself, we require that loop guards
do not depend on probabilistically sampled values; we assume
in the remainder of this work that the programs under veri-
fication satisfy this condition. Additionally, the soundness of
the method relies on the fact that all verified programs are
terminating, which is enforced by the Hoare logic rules in
Fig. 3.
The probabilistic constructions are mapped to invocations
to the abstract procedures Lap⋄ and Exp⋄. The semantics of
these procedures is non-deterministic, in order to simulate
sampling from a probability distribution. We axiomatize these
abstract procedures with Hoare specifications: Figure 4 gives
the new specifications. Notice that both abstract procedures
have a side effect: they increment the privacy budget variable
vǫ. In Section V-C, we introduce a alternative specification for
Lap⋄ that also increments the budget variable vδ.
⌈skip⌉ = skip
⌈c1; c2⌉ = ⌈c1⌉; ⌈c2⌉
⌈x← e⌉ = x1 ← e1; x2 ← e2
⌈x $← Lapǫ(e)⌉ = (x1, x2)← Lap⋄(e1, e2)
⌈x $← Expǫ(s, e)⌉ = (x1, x2)← Exp⋄(s1, e1, s2, e2)
⌈if b then c else d⌉= assert (b1 = b2);
if b1 then ⌈c⌉ else ⌈d⌉
⌈while b do c⌉ = assert (b1 = b2);
while b1 do
⌈c⌉; assert (b1 = b2)
Fig. 5: Self-product construction
F. An alternative characterization of privacy
For the proof of soundness, we will use an alternative char-
acterization of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy based on the notion of
ǫ-distance. This notion is adapted from the asymmetric notion
of distance used by Barthe et al. [11].
Definition 4 (ǫ-distance): The ǫ-distance ∆ǫ is defined as
∆ǫ(µ1, µ2)
def
= max
S⊆A
(µ1 S − exp(ǫ)µ2 S),
where µS def=
∑
a∈S µa. We define max over an empty set
to be 0, so ∆ǫ(µ1, µ2) ≥ 0.
By the definition of ǫ-distance, a probabilistic program c
is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to ǫ > 0, δ ≥ 0,
and a relation Φ on the initial memories of c if for every two
memories m1 and m2 related by Φ, we have
∆ǫ(JcK m1, JcK m2) ≤ δ.
The proof of our main theorem relies on a lifting oper-
ator that turns a relation on memories into a relation on
distributions over memory. Given a relation on memories Φ,
and real values ǫ, δ we define the lifted relation on memory
distributions Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 as follows.
Definition 5: For all memory distributions µ1, µ2,
µ1Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 µ2 if there exists µ such that:
1) πi µ ≤ µi,
2) ∀m1,m2. µ(m1 ⊕m2)⇒ m1Φm2, and
3) ∆ǫ(µi, πi µ) ≤ δ,
where
• (π1 µ)m1 =
∑
m2∈M µ (m1,m2), and
• (π2 µ)m2 =
∑
m1∈M µ (m1,m2).
⊢ (x1, x2)← Lap⋄ǫ (e1, e2) : vǫ = ǫ0 ∧ vδ = δ0 =⇒ x1 = x2 ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 + |e1 − e2|ǫ ∧ vδ = δ0
⊢ (x1, x2)← Exp⋄ǫ (s1, e1, s2, e2) : s1 = s2 ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 ∧ vδ = δ0 =⇒ x1 = x2 ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 + ǫ maxr |s1(x1, r) − s2(x2, r)|
Fig. 4: Hoare specification for Lap⋄ and Exp⋄
Notice that ǫ-distance between distributions is closely related
to the lifting of the equality relation, i.e.,
µ1=〈ǫ,δ〉 µ2 ⇐⇒ ∆ǫ(µ1, µ2) ≤ δ. (1)
Note that the second equation is precisely the condition on
output distributions needed for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
G. Soundness of the self-product technique
We can now state the soundness theorem for our approach.
Recall that we consider only programs with a single return
statement; we will label this returned value out1 and out2 in
the first and second runs, respectively.
Theorem 5: If the following Hoare judgment is valid
⊢ ⌈c⌉ : Ψ ∧ vǫ=0 ∧ vδ=0 =⇒ out1=out2 ∧ vǫ≤ǫ ∧ vδ≤δ
then c satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
The proof of Theorem 5 follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 2: Let Φ be a relation on memories, and suppose
⊢ ⌈c⌉ : Ψ ∧ vǫ = 0 ∧ vδ = 0 =⇒ Φ ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ.
Then, for all memories m1,m2 such that m1Ψm2, we have
(JcKm1)Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 (JcKm2).
The lemma is proved by structural induction on c; we provide
technical details in the full version of the paper.
IV. COMPARISON WITH apRHL
Now that we have defined our transformation, we com-
pare our approach to a custom logic for verifying privacy.
apRHL [11] is a quantitative, probabilistic and relational
program logic for reasoning about differential privacy, with
judgments of the form3
⊢ c1 ∼〈α,δ〉 c2 : Ψ =⇒ Φ,
where c1 and c2 are probabilistic programs, Ψ and Φ are
memory relations, and ǫ, δ are real values. The main result of
apRHL states that if ⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c2 : Ψ =⇒ out1 = out2 is
derivable, where c1 and c2 are the result of renaming variables
in c to make them separable, then c is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private with respect to the relation Ψ on initial memories.
The original presentation of the apRHL logic [11] is or-
ganized in three sets of rules: the first set includes a set of
core rules, the second set includes a generalized rule for loops
(see Fig. 7), and the third set includes rules for mechanisms
such as the Laplace and Exponential Mechanism. We refer
3The original apRHL rules are based on a multiplicative privacy budget.
We adapt the rules to an additive privacy parameter for consistency with the
rest of the article.
to the fragment consisting of the first and third set of rules
as core apRHL; its rules are displayed in Fig. 6. Note that
the, in contrast with [11], the rule for sequential composition
does not have any side condition; this is due to the fact that
the rule for random assignments in [11] allows sampling from
strict sub-distributions, whereas we only allow sampling using
the Laplace and Exponential mechanisms.
The following lemma shows that our approach subsumes
core apRHL, in the sense that every probabilistic program c
verified (ǫ, δ)-differentially private using core apRHL can be
verified using our self-product technique.
Lemma 3: For every probabilistic program c, memory re-
lations Ψ,Φ and real expressions ǫ, δ such that the following
core apRHL judgment is derivable
⊢ c ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c : Ψ =⇒ Φ
we have
⊢ ⌈c⌉ : Ψ =⇒ Φ ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ.
The proof of this result is straightforward, by induction on the
derivation of the apRHL judgement.
The embedding is more expressive than core apRHL in
its treatment of loops. This is because privacy consumption
in core apRHL is tracked by an accumulator which is part
of the judgment itself, independent of the pre-condition and
the initial memory. Using self-products, reasoning about the
privacy budget is carried out in the Hoare specification and
consequently inherits the full expressivity of the Hoare logic.
On the other hand, we have not been able to capture the
generalized rule for loops from apRHL, which is given in
Fig. 7, with self-products. In the following section, we provide
a more detailed comparison with apRHL based on examples.
We conclude with a broader perspective on the two for-
malisms. The primary goal of our approach is to strike a good
balance between expressivity and simplicity, including for the
latter ease of use and ease of implementation. In contrast to
apRHL, which requires a relational verification infrastructure,
our approach reuses a very standard verification technology,
namely Hoare logic, and can be directly implemented by
defining the appropriate program transformation, and using
off-the-shelf tools for Hoare logic or even invariant generation.
We believe this latter approach is simpler to deploy for
programming languages for which verification environments
based on Hoare logic are already available.
V. EXAMPLES
In this section, we apply our method to four examples.
The first example (smart sum) is an algorithm for computing
⊢ x1 ← e1 ∼〈0,0〉 x2 ← e2 : Φ {e1/x1} {e2/x2} =⇒ Φ
[assn]
⊢ y1 $← Lapǫ(e1) ∼〈|e1−e2|ǫ,0〉 y2 $← Lapǫ(e2) : true =⇒ y1 = y2
[lap]
⊢ y1 $← Expǫ(s1, e1) ∼〈ǫ maxr |s1(x1,r)−s2(x2,r)|,0〉 y2 $← Expǫ,s(s2, e2) : s1 = s2 =⇒ y1 = y2
[exp]
⊢ skip ∼〈0,0〉 skip : Ψ =⇒ Ψ
[skip]
⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c2 : Ψ ∧ b1 =⇒ Φ ⊢ d1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 d2 : Ψ ∧ ¬b1 =⇒ Φ
⊢ if b1 then c1 else d1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 if b2 then c2 else d2 : Ψ ∧ b1 = b2 =⇒ Φ
[cond]
⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c2 : Θ ∧ b1 ∧ k = e =⇒ Θ ∧ k < e
Θ ∧ n ≤ e =⇒ ¬b1 Θ =⇒ b1 = b2
⊢ while b1 do c1 ∼〈nǫ,nδ〉 while b2 do c2 : Θ ∧ 0 ≤ e =⇒ Θ ∧ ¬b1
[while]
⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c2 : Ψ =⇒ Φ′ ⊢ c′1 ∼〈ǫ′,δ′〉 c′2 : Φ′ =⇒ Φ
⊢ c1; c′1 ∼〈ǫ+ǫ′,δ+δ′〉 c2; c′2 : Ψ =⇒ Φ
[seq]
⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫ′,δ′〉 c2 : Ψ′ =⇒ Φ′ Ψ⇒ Ψ′ Φ′ ⇒ Φ ǫ′ ≤ ǫ δ′ ≤ δ
⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c2 : Ψ =⇒ Φ
[weak]
Fig. 6: Core proof rules of the approximate relational Hoare logic
Θ =⇒ b1〈1〉 ≡ b2〈2〉 ∧ P 〈1〉 ≡ P 〈2〉 ∧ i〈1〉 = i〈2〉 Θ ∧ n ≤ i〈1〉 =⇒ ¬b1〈1〉
⊢ c1; assert (¬P ) ∼〈ǫj ,0〉 c2; assert (¬P ) : Θ ∧ (b1 ∧ i = j ∧ ¬P )〈1〉 =⇒ Θ ∧ i〈1〉 = j+1
⊢ c1; assert (P ) ∼〈ǫ,0〉 c2; assert (P ) : Θ ∧ (b1 ∧ i = j ∧ ¬P )〈1〉 =⇒ Θ ∧ i〈1〉 = j+1
⊢ c1 ∼〈0,0〉 c2 : Θ ∧ (b1 ∧ i = j ∧ P )〈1〉 =⇒ Θ ∧ (i = j+1 ∧ P )〈1〉
⊢ while b1 do c1 ∼〈ǫ+∑n−1i=0 ǫi,0〉 while b2 do c2 : Θ ∧ i〈1〉 = 0 =⇒ Θ ∧ ¬b1〈1〉
[gwhile]
Fig. 7: Generalized rule for loops
statistics; it involves intricate applications of the composition
theorem, and is thus an interesting test case. The second
example (Iterative Database Construction, or more precisely
the Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism) is an
algorithm that computes a synthetic database; it combines the
Laplace and the Exponential mechanisms, and has not been
verified in earlier work using relational logic. The third exam-
ple (Propose-Test-Release) is an algorithm that only achieves
approximate differential privacy (i.e., (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
with δ > 0) using both the privacy and accuracy properties
of the Laplace distribution. To best of our knowledge, we
provide the first machine-checked proof of this mechanism.
Finally, our last example (vertex cover) is an algorithm that
achieves differential privacy by carefully adding noise to
sampled values; this example can only be verified partially
using our method, and illustrates the differences with apRHL.
A. Smart sum
In this example, a database db is a list of real numbers
[r1, . . . , rT ] and we consider two databases adjacent if they
are the same length T , at most one entry differs between the
two databases, and that entry differs by at most 1.
Suppose we want to release private sums of the first i
entries, simultaneously for every i ∈ [1 . . . T ]: that is, given
[r1, r2, r3, r4, . . . , rT ] we want to privately release[
r1,
2∑
i=1
ri,
3∑
i=1
ri,
4∑
i=1
ri, . . . ,
T∑
i=1
ri
]
.
An interesting sophisticated differentially private algorithm
for this problem is the two-level counter from Chan, et al. [14];
we call this algorithm smartsum.
At a high level, this algorithm groups the input list into
blocks of length q, and adds Laplace noise to the sum for
each block. More concretely, to compute a running sum from
1 to t with t a multiple of q, we simply add together the first
t/q block sums. If t is not a multiple of q, say t = qs + r
with r < q, we take the first s block sums and add a noised
version of each of the r remaining elements.
For an example, suppose we take q = 3 and T is a multiple
of 3. For brevity, let us use the notation L(r) to describe the
result of the application of Laplace, for a fixed value ǫ to r.
Then, the output of smartsum is
[
L (r1) , L (r1) + L (r2) , L
(
3∑
i=1
ri
)
,
L
(
3∑
i=1
ri
)
+ L (r4) , . . . ,
T/3∑
j=0
L
(
3∑
i=1
r3j+i
) .
To informally argue privacy, observe that if we run the
Laplace mechanism on each individual entry, there is no pri-
vacy cost for the indices where the adjacent databases are the
same. So, the privacy analysis for smartsum is straightforward:
changing an input element will change exactly two noisy
sums—the sum for the block containing i, and the noisy
version of i—and each noisy sum that can change requires
ǫ privacy budget, since we are using the Laplace mechanism
with parameter ǫ. Thus, smartsum is 2ǫ-private.
The full program, together with the transformation into a
synchronized product program, is presented in Fig. 8. The
formal verification of the 2ǫ-differential privacy follows the
argument above. The pre-condition states that the two input
databases are adjacent, while the post-condition requires equal-
ity on the outputs and bounds the accumulated privacy budget
by 2ǫ.
The interesting part for our verification is the while loop.
Indeed, this requires a loop invariant to keep track of the
privacy budget, which depends on whether the differing entry
has been processed or not. Note that this invariant does not fit
the core apRHL while rule of Fig. 6: to deal with this example,
Barthe et al. [11] use the generalized while rule from Fig. 7.
This rule is able to perform a refined analysis depending on
a predicate that is preserved across the first iterations, until
some critical iteration is reached. In contrast, here we do not
require any special verification rule: the standard while rule
from Hoare logic suffices.
More precisely, we apply the Hoare while rule with the
invariant:
adjacent(l1, l2) ∧ out1 = out2 ∧ next1 = next2 ∧ n1 = n2∧
|c1 − c2| ≤ 1 ∧ (l1 6= l2 ⇒ vǫ = 0)∧
(c1 6= c2 ⇒ l1 = l2 ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ) ∧ (l1 = l2 → vǫ ≤ 2 ǫ)
Notice from the invariant that if the accumulators c1 and c2
differ we have l1 = l2. This corresponds to the fact that
the differing entry has been processed and so the remaining
database entries coincide. Also, if this is the case then the
privacy budget of 2 ǫ has been already consumed.
The verification of this invariant proceeds by case analysis.
We have three cases: a) the differing entry has not been
processed yet and will not be processed in the following
iteration, b) the differing entry has not been processed yet
but is going to be processed in the next iteration, and c) the
differing entry has already been processed, in which case there
is no more privacy budget consumption.
next← 0;n← 0; c← 0;
while 0 < length l do
if length lmod q = 0 then
x← Lap ǫ(c+ hd l);
n← x+ n;
next← n;
c← 0;
out← next :: out;
else
x← Lap ǫ(hd l);
next← next+ x;
c← c+ hd l;
out← next :: out;
l← tl l;
return out;
(a) Original probabilistic algorithm
vǫ ← 0; next1 ← 0; next2 ← 0;
n1 ← 0; n2 ← 0; c1 ← 0; c2 ← 0;
assert ((0 < length l1)⇔ (0 < length l2));
while 0 < length l1 do
assert ((length l1 mod q = 0)⇔ (length l2 mod q = 0));
if length l1mod q = 0 then
(x1, x2)← Lap⋄ǫ (c1 + hd l1, c2 + hd l2));
n1 ← x1 + n1; n2 ← x2 + n2;
next1 ← n1; next2 ← n2;
c1 ← 0; c2 ← 0;
out1 ← next1 :: out1; out2 ← next2 :: out2;
else
(x1, x2)← Lap⋄ǫ (hd l1, hd l2));
next1 ← next1 + x1; next2 ← next2 + x2;
c1 ← c1 + hd l1; c2 ← c2 + hd l2;
out1 ← next1 :: out1; out2 ← next2 :: out2;
l1 ← tl l1; l2 ← tl l2;
return (out1, out2);
(b) Synchronized non-probabilistic product
Fig. 8: smartsum algorithm
B. Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism
While answering queries on a database with the Laplace
mechanism is a simple way to guarantee privacy, the added
noise quickly renders the results useless as the number of
queries grows. To handle larger collections of queries, there
has been much research on sophisticated algorithms based on
learning theory.
One such scheme is Iterative Database Construction (IDC),
due to Gupta et al. [27]. The basic idea is simple: given a
database dˆ, the algorithm gradually builds a synthetic database
that approximates the original database. The synthetic database
is built over several rounds; after some fixed number of rounds,
the synthetic database is released and used to answer all
queries.
The essence of the algorithm is the computation that it
performs at each round. Let Q be a collection of queries
that we want to answer and let di be the synthetic database
computed at round i. During round i+1, the algorithm selects
a query q ∈ Q with high error; that is, a query where the
current approximate database di and the true database dˆ give
very different answers. This selection is done in a differentially
private way. Next, the algorithm computes a noisy version
v of q evaluated on the true database dˆ. Again, this step
must be differentially private. Finally, q, v and the current
database di approximation are fed into an update algorithm,
which generates the next approximation di+1 of the synthetic
database (hopefully performing better on q).
The idea is that in many cases, this iterative procedure
will provably find an approximation with low error on all
queries in Q in a small number of steps. Hence, we can
run IDC for a small number of steps, and release the final
database approximation as the output. Queries in Q can then
be evaluated on this output for an accurate estimate of the true
answer to the query.
IDC is actually a family of algorithms parameterized by
an algorithm to privately find a high-error query (called the
private distinguisher), and the update function (called the
database update algorithm). For concreteness, let us consider
one well-studied instantiation, the Multiplicative Weights Ex-
ponential Mechanism (MWEM) algorithm originally due to
Hardt and Rothblum [29] and experimentally evaluated by
Hardt et al. [28].
MWEM uses the exponential mechanism to privately select
a query with high error—the quality score of a query q to
be maximized is the error of the query, i.e., the absolute
difference between q evaluated on the approximate database
di and q evaluated on the true database dˆ. The update function
applies the multiplicative weights update [3] to adjust the
approximation to perform better on the mishandled query. This
step is non-private: it does not touch the private data directly.
Hence, we do not concern ourselves with the details here, and
treat the update step as a black box. (The reader can find
further details in Hardt et al. [28].) The full program, together
with the transformation into a synchronized product program,
is presented in Fig. 9.
We briefly comment on the program. We let di denote the
i-th iteration of the synthetic database, and dˆ denote the true
database. Initially the synthetic database d0 is set to some
default value def . Then we define the score function si that
takes as inputs a database D and a query Q and returns
the error of the query Q on the current approximation di
compared to D. We then apply the exponential mechanism
to the true database dˆ with the score function si, and we call
the result qi. We then evaluate qi on the real database, and
add Laplace noise; we call the result ai. Finally, we apply
the update function to obtain the next iteration di+1 of the
synthetic database. Once the number of rounds is exhausted,
we return the last computed synthetic databases.
For the privacy proof, we assume that all queries in Q are
1-sensitive. Note that we run T iterations of MWEM; by the
i← 0;
d0 ← def;
while i < T do
si ← λD Q. |Q(di)−Q(D)|
qi ← Expǫ (si, dˆ);
ai ← Lapǫ (qi dˆ);
di+1 ← update (di, ai, qi);
i← i+ 1;
return dT ;
(a) Original probabilistic algorithm
vǫ ← 0; i1 ← 0; i2 ← 0;
d01 ← def; d02 ← def;
assert (i1 < T ⇔ i2 < T );
while i1 < T do
si1 ← λD Q. |Q(di1)−Q(D)|;
si2 ← λD Q. |Q(di2)−Q(D)|;
(qi1, q
i
2)← Exp⋄ǫ (si1, dˆ1, si2, dˆ2);
(ai1, a
i
2)← Lap⋄ǫ (qi1(dˆ1), qi2(dˆ2));
di+11 ← update (di1, ai1, qi1);
di+12 ← update (di2, ai2, qi2);
i1 ← i1 + 1;
i2 ← i2 + 1;
assert (i1 < T ⇔ i2 < T );
return (dT1 , d
T
2 );
(b) Synchronized non-probabilistic product
Fig. 9: MWEM algorithm
composition theorem, it is sufficient to analyze the privacy
budget consumed by each iteration. Each iteration, we select a
query with the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter
ǫ, and we estimate the true answer of this query with the
Laplace mechanism, parameter ǫ. By the composition theorem
(Theorem 3), the whole algorithm is private with parameter
2 · T · ǫ = 2T ǫ, as desired. The proof can be transcripted
directly into Hoare logic using self-products; we take as pre-
condition adjacency of the two databases, and use adjacency
to conclude that the sensitivity of the score function si is 1 at
each iteration.
C. Propose-Test-Release
The examples we have considered so far all rely on the
composition theorem. While this is a quite powerful and
useful theorem, not all algorithms use composition. In this
section, we consider one such example: the Propose-Test-
Release (PTR) framework [21], [36]. PTR is also an example
of an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism for δ > 0.
The motivation comes from private release of statistics that
are sometimes, but not always, very sensitive. For example,
suppose our database is an ordered list of numbers between 0
and 1000, and suppose we want to release the median element
of the database. This can be highly sensitive: consider the
database [0, 0, 1000] with median 0. Adding a record 1000
x← DistToInstability (q, d);
y ← Lap ǫ x;
if (|y| > log(2/δ)/(2ǫ))
return (q d);
else
return (⊥);
Fig. 10: PTR algorithm
to the database would lead to a large change in the median
(now 500, if we average the two elements closest to the
median when the database has even size). However, many
other databases have low sensitivities: for [0, 10, 10, 1000],
the median will remain unchanged (at 10) no matter what
element we add or remove from the database. We may hope
that we can privately compute the median in this second case
with much less noise than needed for the first case. More
generally, the second database is quite stable—all adjacent
databases have the same median value. In contrast, the first
database is instable—adjacent databases may have wildly
different median values. With this example in mind, we now
explain the general PTR framework.
Suppose we want to privately release the result of a query q
evaluated on a database d. We assume that databases are taken
from a set D and that there exists a notion of distance ∆ on
D, such that pairs of input memory related by Φ correspond
to databases at distance at most 1 under ∆. First, we estimate
the distance to instability—that is, the largest distance x such
that q(d) = q(d′) for all databases d′ at distance x or less from
d. Since this a 1-sensitive function (moving to a neighboring
database can change the distance to instability by at most
1), we can release this distance privately using the Laplace
mechanism (say, with parameter ǫ). Call the result y. Now,
we compare y to a threshold t (to be specified later). If y is
less than the threshold, we output q(d) with no noise. If y is
greater than the threshold, we output a default value ⊥. The
program is given in Fig. 10.
The privacy of the algorithm can be informally justified in
two parts. First, suppose that instead of outputting q(d) or
⊥, we simply output which branch the program took. This is
ǫ-differentially private: computing y is ǫ-differentially private
(via the Laplace mechanism), and the resulting branch is a
post-processing of y. Hence, we can assume that the same
branch is taken in both executions.
Second, we can conclude that the original program (out-
putting q(d) or ⊥) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for any
adjacent databases d and d′ with q(d) 6= q(d′), the first
branch is taken with probability at most δ. By properties of the
Laplace mechanism, we can set the threshold t large enough
so that with probability at least 1− δ, the first branch is only
taken if x is strictly positive. In this case we can conclude
q(d) = q(d′), since q(d) 6= q(d′) implies that x is 0 on both
executions. So, we can safely release q(d) = q(d′) with no
noise. Of course, if the second branch is taken, then it is also
safe to release ⊥ in both runs.
{∆(d1, d2) ≤ 1}
vǫ ← 0;
vδ ← 0;
x1 ← DistToInstability (q, d1);
x2 ← DistToInstability (q, d2);{
(q(d1) = q(d2) ∨ x1 = x2 = 0)
∧vǫ = 0 ∧ vδ = 0
}
(y1, y2)← Lap⋄ǫ (x1, x2);

(q(d1) = q(d2)) ∨ (x1 = x2 = 0
∧|y1 − x1| ≤ log(2/δ)/(2ǫ))
∧y1 = y2 ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ


assert (|y1| > log(2/δ)/(2ǫ)⇔ |y2| > log(2/δ)/(2ǫ));
if (|y1| > log(2/δ)/(2ǫ)){
q(d1) = q(d2) ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ
}
return (q(d1), q(d2));{
out1 = out2 ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ
}
else{
vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ
}
return (⊥,⊥);{
out1 = out2 ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ
}
Fig. 11: Proof of Propose-Test-Release
More formally, the proof of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for
PTR rests on two properties of the Laplace mechanism: the
privacy property captured by Theorem 1 and the accuracy
property captured by Lemma 1.
Fig. 11 presents the proof of PTR using the synchronized
product program—the code is interleaved with some of the
pre- and post-conditions. The proof uses the accuracy property
of the Laplace mechanism and the properties of the distance
to instability that we give as specifications in Fig. 12. For
simplicity, we treat distance to instability as an abstract
procedure; however, it can be implemented as a loop over
all databases, in which case the specification can be proved.
The soundness of the accuracy specification for the Laplace
mechanism follows by Lemma 1.
D. Vertex cover
A vertex cover for a graph g = (N,E) is a set S of nodes
such that for every edge (t, u) ∈ E, either t ∈ S or u ∈ S.
The minimum vertex cover is the problem of finding a vertex
cover of a minimum size. Gupta et al. [26] study the problem
of privately computing a minimum vertex cover in a setting
where the nodes of the graph are public, but its edges are
private. Since a vertex cover leaks information about vertices
(for instance, any two nodes that are not in the vertex cover are
certainly not connected by an edge), their algorithm outputs
an enumeration of the nodes of the graph, from which a vertex
cover can be recomputed efficiently from the knowledge of the
set E. Their algorithm is challenging to verify because rather
than relying on mechanisms, it achieves privacy by sampling
according to a suitable noisy distribution choose. The code of
the algorithm is shown in Fig. 13.
⊢ (y1, y2)← Lap⋄ǫ (x1, x2) : x1 = x2 ∧ vδ = δˆ =⇒ y1 = y2 ∧ |y1 − x1| ≤ log(2/δ)/(2ǫ) ∧ vδ = δˆ + δ
⊢ x1 ← DistToInstability (q, d1);x2 ← DistToInstability (q, d2) : ∆(d1, d2) ≤ 1 =⇒ q(d1) = q(d2) ∨ x1 = x2 = 0
Fig. 12: Accuracy specification for the Laplace mechanism, and specification for distance to instability.
n← |E|;
out← [ ];
while g 6= ∅ do
v ← chooseǫ,n(g);
out← v :: out;
g ← g \ {v};
return out;
Fig. 13: Minimum vertex cover
We say that two graphs g1 and g2 are adjacent if they differ
at most in one edge 〈t, u〉. By defining choose as
Pr [v ← chooseǫ,n(g) : v = v′] ∝
(
dE,V (v
′) +
4
ǫ
√
n
|E|
)
where g = (E, V ) and n is a given parameter, one obtains
an (ǫ, 0)-differentially private algorithm with respect to the
adjacency relation as defined above.
In [11], Barthe et al prove differential privacy of vertex
cover in apRHL. The proof uses the generalized rule for
loops, a code motion rule that allows to swap independent
statements, and a rule for dealing with statements of the form
x $← µ; assert (φ). It also relies on apRHL specifications of
choose, that are proven correct in the Coq proof assistant
from the definition of choose.
We now consider the formal verification of the vertex cover
algorithm using self-products. We first extend the definition of
self-product to choose. Then, there are two cases to consider:
g2 = g1 ∪ {〈u, t〉} and g1 = g2 ∪ {〈u, t〉}. In the first case,
we can use the first Hoare specification from Fig. 14. In the
second case, we use the second and third specifications from
Fig. 14. Using these specifications, it is possible to verify
that the self-product of the vertex cover algorithm satisfies
the Hoare specification of Theorem 5. However, we have not
yet been able to extend the proof of Theorem 5 to deal with
the choose self-product.
E. Formal verification of the examples
The examples above (with the exception of vertex cover)
have been formally verified. For each example, we have built
the corresponding self-product program, and verified this result
using the non-probabilistic and non-relational Hoare logic
rules available in the EasyCrypt [6] framework. As described
above, we have used non-probabilistic axiomatic specifications
for the primitives. Apart from the axiomatic specification, and
the code for the program and the self-product construction, the
longest Hoare logic verification proof (for MWEM) consists
of about 50 lines of code. This demonstrates the simplicity
offered by the self-product construction. The code for these
examples (and others) is available online [1].
VI. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy, first proposed by Blum et al. [13] and
formally defined by Dwork et al. [22], has been an area
of intensive research in the last decade. We have touched
on a handful of private algorithms, including algorithms for
computing running sums [14], [23] (part of a broader literature
on streaming privacy), answering large classes of queries [29],
[28] (part of a broader literature on learning-theoretic ap-
proaches to data privacy), the Propose-Test-Release framework
for answering stable queries in a noiseless way [21], [36],
and private combinatorial optimization [26]. We refer readers
interested in a more comprehensive treatment to the excellent
surveys by Dwork [19], [20].
Verifying differential privacy: Several tools have been
proposed for providing formal verification of the differen-
tial privacy guarantee; we can roughly classify them by
the verification approach they use. PINQ [30] provides an
encapsulation for LINQ —an SQL-like language embedded
in C#—tracking at runtime the privacy budget consumption,
and aborting the computation when the budget is exhausted.
Airavat [34] combines a similar runtime monitor with access
control in a MapReduce framework. While PINQ is restricted
to ǫ-differential privacy, Airavat can handle also approximate
differential privacy using a runtime monitor for δ.
Another approach is based on linear type systems.
Fuzz [33] and DFuzz [25] use a type-based approach for
inferring and checking the sensitivity of functional programs.
This sensitivity analysis combined with the use of trusted prob-
abilistic primitives provides the differential privacy guarantee.
Interestingly, this type-based approach can be combined with
type systems for cryptographic protocols to verify differential
privacy for distributed protocols [24]. All these systems pro-
vide automatic verification of differential privacy. However,
they fail to verify all the examples that we can handle, like
advanced sum statistics [14] and the Propose-Test-Release
framework [21]. Moreover, so far they can address only pure
differential privacy, where δ = 0.
Tschantz, et al. [37] consider a verification framework for
interactive private programs, where the algorithm can receive
new input and produce multiple outputs over a series of steps.
They follow an approach similar to ours by verifying the
correct use of differentially private primitives. However, their
programs are well-modeled by probabilistic I/O-automata,
and they provide a proof technique based on probabilistic
bisimulation. Also, their method is currently limited to pure
differential privacy.
⊢ (v1, v2)← choose⋄ǫ,n(g1, g2) : g1 ∪ {〈u, t〉} = g2 ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 =⇒ v1 = v2 ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 + ǫ/
(
2
√
n
√
|g1|
)
⊢ (v1, v2)← choose⋄ǫ,n(g1, g2) : g1 = g2 ∪ {〈u, t〉} ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 =⇒ (v 6= t ∧ v 6= u) ∧ vǫ = ǫ0
⊢ (v1, v2)← choose⋄ǫ,n(g1, g2) : g1 = g2 ∪ {〈u, t〉} ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 =⇒ (v = t ∨ v = u) ∧ vǫ = ǫ0 + ǫ/4
Fig. 14: Hoare specifications for choose⋄
Finally, CertiPriv [11] and EasyCrypt [6] use custom
relational logics to verify differential privacy. These systems
are very expressive: they supports general (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, they can verify privacy for mechanisms like the
Laplace and the Exponential mechanism, and they can capture
advanced examples that go beyond mechanisms and compo-
sition, like the private vertex cover algorithm of Gupta et
al. [26]. The difficulty with their approach is that it relies
on a customized and complex logic. Moreover, ad hoc rules
for loops are required for many advanced examples.
Verifying 2-safety properties: Beyond differential privacy,
there is a large body of literature on verifying 2-safety prop-
erties. Our work is most closely related to deductive methods
based on program logics; more precisely, approaches that
reduce 2-safety of a program c to safety of a program c′ built
from c. Such approaches include self-composition [7], prod-
uct programs [38], and type-directed product programs [35].
These approaches are subsumed by work by Barthe et al. [4],
[5].
Another alternative is to reason directly on two programs
(or two executions of the same program) using relational
program logics such as Benton’s relational Hoare logic [12],
or specialized relational logics, e.g., for information flow [2].
CertiCrypt [9], and EasyCrypt [8], [6], are computer-aided
tools that support relational reasoning about probabilistic
programs and have been used to prove security of crypto-
graphic constructions and computational differential privacy of
protocols. For such applications, reasoning about structurally
different programs is essential.
Chaudhuri et al. [15] develop an automated method for
analyzing the continuity and the robustness of programs.
Robustness is a 2-safety property that is very similar to
sensitivity as used in differential privacy. An interesting aspect
of their work is that their analysis is able to reason about two
unsynchronized pairs of executions; that is, pairs of executions
that may have different control flow.
Verification of hyperproperties: Developing general veri-
fication methods for hyperproperties remains a challenge; how-
ever, there have been some recent proposals in this direction
(e.g., [16], [32]).
Other work: There is an extensive body of work on
deductive verification of non-probabilistic and probabilistic
programs, as well as many works that consider product con-
structions of Labeled Transition Systems; summarizing this
large literature is beyond the scope of this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a program transformation that reduces
proving (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy of a probabilistic program
to proving a safety property of a deterministic transformed
program. The method applies to all standard examples where
privacy is achieved through mechanisms and composition
theorems; on the other hand, differentially private algorithms
based on ad hoc output perturbation, such as the differentially
private vertex cover algorithm [26], are more difficult to
handle. In particular, they fall outside the scope of Theorem 5
which proves the soundness of our approach. Our method is
particularly suited for reasoning about differential privacy, be-
cause the transformed program can be analyzed with standard
verification tools. Our method can also be extended to reason
about probabilistic non-interference, at the cost of targeting an
assertion language that supports existential quantification over
functions. Directions for further work include extending the
scope of Theorem 5 to deal with more complex examples, like
vertex cover. On a more practical side, it would be interesting
to implement our transformation for a realistic setting, for
instance modeling the PINQ language [30].
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APPENDIX A
AUXILIARY LEMMAS
The following is an auxiliary result used in the proof of correctness of the method based on self-products.
Lemma 4: Suppose that for all memories m1,m2 such that m1Ψm2 we have that c is terminating in m1 and m2, and
(JcKm1)Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 (JcKm2). Then, for every memory distributions µ1, µ2 such that µ1 Ψ〈ǫ′,δ′〉 µ2 we have
(JcK⋆ µ1)Φ〈ǫ+ǫ′,δ+δ′〉 (JcK⋆ µ2)
The following is another auxiliary result used in the proof of correctness.
Lemma 5: For all memories m1,m2 such that m1Ψm2 we have that 1m1 Ψ〈0,0〉 1m2 .
Proof: We can take as witness µˆ = 1m1,m2 .
Lemma 6: Suppose that for m1,m2 such that m1Ψm2 we have that (µ1m1)Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 (µ2m2). Then,
((λv.1m1{v/x})
⋆ µ1)Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 ((λv.1m2{v/x})
⋆ µ2)
Proof: By Lemma 5 and Lemma 4.
The proof of the next two auxiliary lemmas are presented in the work in apRHL [11].
Lemma 7: Given a relation S that is preserved by c, i.e. such that:
∀m1,m2. (m1,m2) ∈ S ⇒ (∀m′1,m′2.(JcKm1m′1 6= 0 ∧ JcKm2m′2 6= 0⇒ (m′1,m′2) ∈ S))
If
∀m1,m2. (m1,m2) ∈ R⇒ (JcKm1)Q〈ǫ,δ〉 (JcKm2)
then
∀m1,m2. (m1,m2) ∈ (R ∩ S)⇒ (JcKm1) (Q ∩ S)〈ǫ,δ〉 (JcKm2)
Lemma 8: For all distribution expressions µ1, µ2, if
∆ǫ(Jµ1Km1, Jµ2Km2) ≤ δ
then
(Jx $← µ1Km1)Q〈ǫ,δ〉 (Jx $← µ2Km2)
where Q = {(m1,m2) | m1 x = m2 x}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
Theorem 5 is a corollary of the following lemma:
Lemma 9:
⊢ ⌈c⌉ : Ψ ∧ vǫ = 0 ∧ vδ = 0 =⇒ Φ ∧ vǫ ≤ ǫ ∧ vδ ≤ δ
implies
∀m1,m2. m1Ψm2 ⇒ (JcKm1)Φ〈ǫ,δ〉 (JcKm2)
Proof: We first introduce some new notation. For any disjoint memories m1,m2 and real values ǫ, δ, m1⊕ǫ,δm2 denotes the
memory m such that mx = m1 x for every x ∈ dom(m1), mx = m2 x for every x ∈ dom(m2), and m vǫ = ǫ and m vδ = δ.
Given a memory relation R ⊆M×M, we let Rˆ〈ǫ,δ〉 stand for the set {m1⊕ǫ′,δ′ m2 | (m1,m2) ∈ R∧ ǫ′ ≤ ǫ∧ δ′ ≤ δ}. The
proof follows by structural induction on c, proving the following lemma: let R,Q ⊆M×M be relations on memories, then(
∀m. m ∈ Rˆǫ,δ ⇒ ∀m′. m′ ∈ (J⌈c⌉Km)⇒ m′ ∈ Qˆǫ′,δ′
)
=⇒
∀m1,m2. (m1,m2) ∈ R⇒ (JcKm1)Q〈ǫ′−ǫ,δ′−δ〉 (JcKm2)
Indeed, by setting ǫ = 0 and ǫ′ = ǫ, we get the statement of Lemma 9.
• Sequential composition: Let (m1,m2) ∈ R. By definition, m1 ⊕ǫ,δ m2 ∈ Rˆǫ,δ. Since m′ vǫ = m′′ vǫ for all m′,m′′ ∈
J⌈c1⌉K (m1⊕ǫ,δm2), then there are ǫ0, δ0 and S ⊆ M × M such that Sˆǫ0.δ0 = J⌈c1⌉Km1 ⊕ǫ,δ m2. Also, from the
hypotheses, for all m ∈ Sˆǫ,δ we have that ∀m′ ∈ (J⌈c2⌉Km). m′ ∈ Qˆǫ′,δ′ . By inductive hypothesis we have thus
1) (Jc1Km1)S〈ǫ0−ǫ,δ0−δ〉 (Jc1Km2)
2) for all m′,m′′ such that (m′,m′′) ∈ S, we have (Jc2Km′)Qǫ′−ǫ0,δ′−δ0(Jc2Km′′)
It follows from Lemma 4 that (Jc2K⋆(Jc1Km1))Q〈ǫ−ǫ,δ′−δ〉 (Jc2K⋆(Jc1Km2)).
• While loop: We start by proving the following auxiliary result:
(∀m. m ∈ Rˆǫ,δ ⇒ (b1 = b2)m ∧ wˆim 6= ⊥ ∧ ∀m′ ∈ (wˆim). m′ ∈ Qˆǫ′,δ′)
=⇒
∀m1m2. (m1,m2) ∈ R⇒ (wim1)Q〈ǫ′−ǫ,δ′−δ〉 (wim2)
The proof follows by natural induction on i. The case i = 0 is trivial. For the inductive step, let m1,m2 ∈ R. Since
m1 ⊕ǫ,δ m2 ∈ Rˆǫ,δ, by hypothesis we have m1 b1 ⇔ m2 b2. We proceed by case analysis on m1 b1.
– In the case ¬m1 b1, by definition of wˆi+1, wˆi+1m1⊕ǫ,δm2 = m1⊕ǫ,δm2, and thus by hypothesis m1⊕ǫ,δm2 ∈ Qˆǫ′,δ′ ,
which implies ǫ = ǫ′ and δ = δ′. By Lemma 5, 1m1 Q〈0,0〉 1m2 , which concludes the proof case since we have as
well wi+1m1 = 1m1 and wi+1m2 = 1m2 .
– If m1 b1 holds, then
wˆi+1m =
⋃
m′∈J⌈c⌉; assert (b1⇔b2)K
wim
′
Since b1 ⇔ b2 is deterministic in J⌈c⌉Km and wˆi+1m 6= ∅ by hypothesis, then
wˆi+1m =
⋃
m′∈J⌈c⌉K
wim
′
By the same reasoning as with sequential composition, there is then S, ǫ0, and δ0 such that Sˆǫ,δ = J⌈c⌉Km1⊕ǫ,δm2.
Then, by the structural inductive hypothesis we have (JcKm1)S〈ǫ0−ǫ,δ0−δ〉 (JcKm2), and by the natural induction
hypothesis
∀m1m2. (m1,m2) ∈ S ⇒ (wim1)Q〈ǫ′−ǫ0,δ′−δ0〉 (wim2)
We can conclude from Lemma 4 that
(wi+1 m1)Q〈ǫ′−ǫ,δ′−δ〉 (wi+1 m2)
It remains to show that the property holds as well when considering the lubs
⊔
wˆi and
⊔
wi:
(∀m. m ∈ Rˆǫ,δ ⇒ (b1 = b2)m ∧ ∀m′ ∈ (
⊔
wˆim). m
′ ∈ Qˆǫ′,δ′)
=⇒
∀m1m2. (m1,m2) ∈ R⇒ (
⊔
wim1)Q〈ǫ′−ǫ,δ′−δ〉 (
⊔
wim2)
Let m1 and m2 such that (m1,m2) ∈ R. Since m1⊕ǫ,δm2 then ∀m′ ∈ (
⊔
wˆim). m
′ ∈ Qˆǫ′,δ′ . Since we are considering
terminating program loops, there exists k such that for all j ≥ k:
wˆj(m1 ⊕ ǫ, δm2) 6= ∅
and furthermore
wˆj(m1 ⊕ ǫ, δm2) =
⊔
wˆi(m1 ⊕ ǫ, δm2)
From the auxiliary lemma above we have thus
(wjm1)Q〈ǫ−ǫ′,δ−δ′〉 (wjm2)
for all j ≥ k. Since the loop termination condition is deterministic by assumption then it also holds that wjm1 =
⊔
i wim1
and wjm2 =
⊔
i wim2 for all j ≥ k. Then we can conclude:
(
⊔
i
wim1)Q〈ǫ−ǫ′,δ−δ′〉 (
⊔
i
wim2)
• Laplace mechanism: We consider the case x $← Lapǫ(e). Let m1 and m2 such that (m1,m2) ∈ R. Then m1⊕ǫ0,δ0 m2 ∈
Rˆǫ0,δ0 . From the hypothesis J⌈c⌉Km ⊆ Qˆǫ′,δ′ and the semantics of the target language, we get⋃
v∈R
(m1 {v/x})⊕ǫ0+|JeKm1−JeKm2|ǫ,δ0 (m2 {v/x}) ⊆ Qˆǫ′,δ′
From this, we can conclude δ′ = δ0, ǫ′ = ǫ0 + |JeKm1 − JeKm2|ǫ and
Q ⊇ {(m1,m2) | ∃v1, v2. (m1 {v1/x} ,m2 {v2/x}) ∈ R} ∩ {(m1,m2) | m1 x = m2 x}
Since the first term in the intersection above is preserved by any assignment to the x variable, by Lemma 7 it is enough
to consider the case Q = {(m1,m2) | m1 x = m2 x}, and prove (JcKm1)Q〈|JeKm1−JeKm2|ǫ,0〉 (JcKm2). To verify this, by
Lemma 8, it is sufficient to show that
∆|JeKm1−JeKm2|ǫ(Lapǫ(JeKm1), Lapǫ(JeKm2)) ≤ 0
We need to show that for every r we have
Lapǫ(JeKm1) r − exp(|JeKm1 − JeKm2|ǫ)Lapǫ(JeKm2) r ≤ 0
Then, it is enough to prove:
 exp
(
− ǫ|r−JeKm1|2
)
∑
r′ exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm1|2
)

− exp(|JeKm1 − JeKm2|ǫ)

 exp
(
− ǫ|r−JeKm2|2
)
∑
r′ exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm2|2
)

 ≤ 0
This is equivalent to prove
exp
(
− ǫ|r−JeKm1|2
)
·∑r′∈R exp(− ǫ|r′−JeKm2|2 )
exp
(
− ǫ|r−JeKm2|2
)
·∑r′∈R exp(− ǫ|r′−JeKm1|2 ) ≤ exp(|JeKm1 − JeKm2|ǫ)
The first term can be bound by
exp
(
ǫ|JeKm2 − JeKm1|
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm2|2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm1|2
)
For every r′ ∈ R, we know |r′ − JeKm2| ≥ |r′ − JeKm1| − |JeKm2 − JeKm1|. So, the above can be bound by
exp
(
ǫ|JeKm2 − JeKm1|
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
− ǫ(|r′−JeKm1|−|JeKm2−JeKm1|)2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm1|2
)
that is equivalent to
exp
(
ǫ|JeKm2 − JeKm1|
2
)
· exp
(
ǫ|JeKm2 − JeKm1|
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm1|2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
− ǫ|r′−JeKm1|2
)
and simplifying
exp
(
ǫ|JeKm2 − JeKm1|
2
)
· exp
(
ǫ|JeKm2 − JeKm1|
2
)
that is what we need.
• Exponential mechanism: Following a similar reasoning to the Laplace mechanism case, we need to prove that for every
r we have
Expǫ(JsKm1, JeKm1) r − exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)Expǫ(JsKm2, JeKm2) r ≤ 0
where Expǫ(s, x) stands for the distribution
λr.
exp
(
ǫs(x,r)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫs(x,r′)
2
)
By Lemma 6 and the fact that JsKm1 = JsKm2 = sˆ it is then enough to prove:
exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)
2
) − exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0) exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm2,r)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm2,r′)
2
)) ≤ 0
This is equivalent to prove
exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r)
2
)
·∑r′∈R exp( ǫsˆ(JeKm2,r′)2 )
exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm2,r)
2
)
·∑r′∈R exp( ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)2 ) ≤ exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)
Continuing we have
exp
(
ǫ(sˆ(JeKm1, r) − sˆ(JeKm2, r))
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm2,r
′)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)
2
) ≤ exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)
Using the fact that maxr∈R |sˆ(e1, r)− sˆ(e2, r)|ǫ ≤ ǫ1 − ǫ0 we have:
exp
(
ǫ1 − ǫ0
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm2,r
′)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)
2
) ≤ exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)
Using the same fact we also know that for every r′ ∈ R we have sˆ(e2, r) ≤ ǫ1−ǫ0ǫ + sˆ(e1, r). So,we have:
exp
(
ǫ1 − ǫ0
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
(ǫ1−ǫ0)+ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)
2
) ≤ exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)
that is equivalent to
exp
(
ǫ1 − ǫ0
2
)
· exp
(
ǫ1 − ǫ0
2
)
·
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r
′)
2
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
ǫsˆ(JeKm1,r′)
2
) ≤ exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)
and simplifying
exp
(
ǫ1 − ǫ0
2
)
· exp
(
ǫ1 − ǫ0
2
)
≤ exp(ǫ1 − ǫ0)
Lemma 10 (Proof of the accuracy specification):
∀m1,m2. JeKm1 = JeKm2 ⇒ (Jx← Lapǫ(e)Km1)Q〈0,δ〉 (Jx← Lapǫ(e)Km2)
where
Q
.
= {(m1,m2) | m1 x = m2 x ∧ |m1 x− JeKm1| ≤ log(2/δ)/(2ǫ)}
Proof: We need to prove:
(Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km1)Q〈0,δ〉 (Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km2)
By the assumption e1 = e2 we have that Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km1 and Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km2 are the same distribution µˆ. Now, consider
the set S = {z : R | |z − Je1Km1| < log(2/δ)/(2ǫ)} and the distribution µ ∈ D(R× R), parametrized on S defined as:
µ(z1, z2) :=
{
µˆ z1 if z1 = z2 ∧ z1 ∈ S
0 otherwise.
Notice that by definition of µˆ we have π1µ ≤ Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km1 and π2µ ≤ Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km2. Moreover, by definition of S
we also have that for every m, µm 6= 0⇒ Φm. Since clearly π1µ = π2µ, the only thing left to prove is that ∆0(µˆ, π1µ) ≤ δ.
This means that we need to prove
max
R⊆R
{µˆR− π1µR} ≤ δ
It is easy to see that on values in R ∩ S the two distribution coincide. So we can instead consider
max
R⊆(R/S)
{µˆR− π1µR} ≤ δ
Now, notice that for every R ⊆ (R/S) we have π1µ = 0, so we can just consider
max
R⊆(R/S)
{µˆ R} ≤ δ
and since by definition µˆ R =
∑
a∈R µˆ a where every value is non-negative, we can just consider µˆ (R/S) ≤ δ. Now, recall
that S corresponds to the interval:
[−(log(2/δ)/(2ǫ)) + JeKm1, JeKm1 + (log(1/δ)/ǫ)]
and that µˆ = Jx $← Lapǫ(e)Km1. So, we can apply a tail bound on the Laplace distribution:
{µˆ z | z ∈ (R/S)} = {µˆ z | |z − JeKm1| ≥ log(2/δ)/(2ǫ)} < δ.
and conclude
µˆ (R/S) ≤ δ
that is what we need.
Lemma 11 (Tail bound for the discrete version of Laplace): Let x be drawn from the discrete version of the Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and parameter b > 0, i.e., with probability
Lb(x) =
exp
(
− |x|2b
)
∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
) .
Then, for T ∈ N and T > 0:
Pr [x : |Lb(x)| > T ] ≤ 2 exp
(
− T
2b
)
.
In particular, if b = 1/ǫ (like in Lap ǫ(x)) and T = log(2/δ)/(2ǫ), we have Lemma 1.
Proof: We have
Pr [x : |Lb(x)| > T ] = Pr

x :
∣∣∣∣∣∣
exp
(
− |x|2b
)
∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > T


= Pr

x : exp
(
− |x|2b
)
∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
) > T

+ Pr

x : exp
(
− |x|2b
)
∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
) < −T


=
∞∑
x=T
exp
(
− |x|2b
)
∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
) + −∞∑
−T
exp
(
− |x|2b
)
∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)
=
∑∞
x=T exp
(− x2b)+∑−∞−T exp( x2b)∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)
=
∑∞
x=0 exp
(−x+T2b )+∑∞x=0 exp(−x−T2b )∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)
=
exp
(− T2b) ∑∞x=0 exp(− x2b)+ exp(− T2b) (1 +∑∞x=1 exp(− x2b))∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)
= exp
(
− T
2b
) (∑∞
x=0 exp
(− x2b)+ 1 +∑∞x=1 exp(− x2b))∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)
= exp
(
− T
2b
)  1∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
) +
(∑∞
x=0 exp
(− x2b)+∑∞x=1 exp(− x2b))∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
)


= exp
(
− T
2b
)  1∑
z∈Z exp
(
− |z|2b
) + 1


≤ 2 exp
(
− T
2b
)
APPENDIX C
VERIFICATION OF VERTEX COVER
The extended logic used to prove the vertex cover in apRHL features a more precise rule for while loops, that allows the
privacy budget to vary at each iteration
Θ =⇒ b1 ≡ b2 ∧ i1 = i2 Θ ∧ n ≤ i1 =⇒ ¬b1
⊢ c1 ∼〈ǫj,δj〉 c2 : Θ ∧ b1 ∧ i1 = j =⇒ Θ ∧ i1 = j+1
⊢ while b1 do c1 ∼〈∑n−1i=0 ǫi,∑n−1i=0 δi〉 while b2 do c2 : Θ ∧ i1 = 0 =⇒ Θ ∧ ¬b1
and a code motion rule that allows to swap statements c1 and c2 provided they satisfy some independence condition:
⊢ c1; c2 ∼〈0,0〉 c2; c1 : ∀x ∈ X.x1 = x2 =⇒ ∀x ∈ X.x1 = x2
In addition, the extended logic features a transitivity rule that allows to compose apRHL judgments. These rules can be readily
encoded in our setting, provided we allow for more general forms of products as considered in [4], [5].
However, the extended logic also considers a probabilistic programming language with assert statements, and ad hoc rules
for random assignments and while loops:
Θ =⇒ b1 ≡ b2 ∧ P1 ≡ P2
⊢ c1; assert (P1) ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 c2; assert (P2) : Θ ∧ b1 ∧ ¬P1 =⇒ Θ
⊢ c1 ∼〈0,0〉 c2 : Θ ∧ b1 =⇒ Θ
⊢ c1 ∼〈0,0〉 c2 : Θ ∧ b1 ∧ P1 =⇒ Θ ∧ P1
⊢ while b1 do c1 ∼〈ǫ,δ〉 while b2 do c2 : Θ =⇒ Θ ∧ ¬b1
These rules are not captured by our approach.
For comparison, we briefly describe the proof in apRHL and the relational specifications of choose that are required for
completing the proof. For the first case, the apRHL proof uses the first generalized loop rule, and the following property of
choose:
⊢ v1 ← chooseǫ,n(g1) ∼〈ǫ/(2√n√|g1|
)
,0
〉 v2 ← chooseǫ,n(g2) : g1 ∪ {〈u1, t1〉} = g2 =⇒ v1 = v2
In the second case, the apRHL uses the second generalized loop rule, and the following properties of choose:
⊢
(
v1 ← chooseǫ,n(g1);
assert (v1 6= u1 ∧ v1 6= t1)
)
∼〈0,0〉
(
v2 ← chooseǫ,n(g2);
assert (v2 6= u2 ∧ v2 6= t2)
)
: g1 = g2 ∪ {〈u2, t2〉} =⇒ v1 = v2,
⊢
(
v1 ← chooseǫ,n(g1);
assert (v1 = u1 ∨ v1 = t1)
)
∼〈 ǫ4 ,0〉
(
v2 ← chooseǫ,n(g2);
assert (v2 = qu2 ∨ v2t2)
)
: g1 = g2 ∪ {〈u2, t2〉} =⇒ v1 = v2.
